The Campaign to Sell a Harsh Peace for Germany to the American Public, 1944 In the spring of 1944, a group of prominent US opinion makers launched a campaign aimed at convincing the American public of the need for a harsh peace for Germany. By exploring the dynamics of this campaign, which revolved around the activities of the Writers' War Board and the Society for the Prevention of World War III, this article focuses on an episode that has generally been neglected in the historiography of US post-war plans for Germany. It also adds a new dimension to the literature on the domestic mood in the US during the crucial period between the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, by first demonstrating how these anti-German spokesmen worked successfully to generate a hardening of popular opinion during 1944 and 1945, before charting how they found it increasingly difficult to sustain their campaign during 1946 and 1947. This failure was not simply a product of the natural cooling of popular passions or even the emergence of the Cold War. It also stemmed from the lobby's inability to sustain the networks it had created during World War II, not to mention its tendency to overreach and oversell at key moments.
On 22 April 1944, a page-long advert appeared in the New York Times. Placed by a new pressure group, the Society for the Prevention of World War III (SPWW3), it warned readers not to be misled by 'a group of German political exiles … working overtime to form a socalled council of democratic Germans in this country.' 'We have been fooled once by socalled German "democracy,"' it stressed. 'Must we be fooled again? This is no time for Americans to work on the manufacture of a device for Germany's escape.' Complementing this advert, the SPWW3 began distributing 100,000 copies of a free book to Congress, newspapers, radio stations, the clergy, and colleges. Entitled Know Your Enemy, this collated statements by Germans of all political persuasions in order to show how the German people have always been 'in their aggressive militarism and fanatic war spirit ... a permanent threat to all peaceful nations.' At the same time, the SPWW3 also began making a list of German exile professors working in the US to weed out any 'Pan Germans,' as well as compiling a file of books, magazines, and newspapers that 'carry "Pan-German" expressions.' As newspapers across the country soon reported, all this activity was the first indication 'that the US is to undergo a full-scale propaganda war' concerning the shape of the forthcoming peace with Germany.
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This effort to sell a harsh peace to the American public would continue after the fighting in Europe had ceased. Ultimately, of course, it failed, for within three years of the war's end the Truman administration was pushing for the revival of the western zones of Germany in order to kick-start a wider European recovery, while opinion polls found that most Americans supported a more positive policy towards the former enemy.
3 Perhaps because of this failure, historians have given scant attention to the activities of the harsh-peace lobby. Indeed, the historiography on America's response to the German problem focuses almost exclusively on private government debates. When the domestic dimension is briefly discussed, a picture emerges of a US public who firmly hated the German enemy by the end of World War II. By 1945, writes John L. Snell in one of the first treatments of the subject, Americans had 'an ignorant animus against Germany.' By the end of the European conflict, agrees Carolyn Eisenberg in a more recent work, polls 'showed the American public to be sympathetic to a tough peace.' 4 Yet the individuals attracted to the harsh-peace lobby were not 2 so confident. Indeed, in 1944 their main motive for launching a propaganda campaign was to try to put an end to the persistent American habit 'of setting the Nazis apart from the German people'; a year later, although riding high in the wake of the concentration camp revelations, they continued to worry that the public might be insufficiently committed to keeping Germany weak. 5 The first aim of this article is thus to explore a neglected aspect of the American domestic mood in the last months of the war, by describing the work of this lobby, its origins, its aims, and above all the tactics it employed to try to shift popular opinion. At the core of this campaign was the SPWW3, which in turn was closely related to, and in many respects a direct outgrowth from, the Writers' War Board (WWB) The second goal of this article is to shed light on the 'transmission process' by which arguments, ideas, and images are placed on the public agenda. 7 Although historians of the 1940s have increasingly focused their attention on 'state-private' networks, exploring the connections that the US government forged with nongovernmental organizations in order to sell particular policies, 8 the literature on public opinion and foreign policy still tends to posit a simplistic relationship between officials and their domestic audience, often neglecting the role of intermediate institutions that occupy a strategic position between them. When it comes to the German problem towards the end of World War II, for example, historians frequently assume that the attitudes of both the government and public opinion hardened at a similar rate, as a natural and almost inevitable product of a tendency 'to think negatively of the entire enemy nation' in time of war. 9 Yet, by focusing on the role of quasi-governmental organizations like the WWB, not to mention the activities of leading pressure groups like the SPWW3, what becomes clear is that there was nothing natural or inevitable about this development. Rather, it was at least partly the result of a conscious effort by the SPWW3 and WWB, working in tandem with certain individuals and institutions in official Washington, to refashion the whole debate. It is therefore important to explore the process by which antiGerman arguments started to dominate the public discourse in the last months of the war.
After 1945, the harsh-peace case went into swift decline. Although the extant literature is again not terribly clear why this happened, one development naturally looms large: the Cold War. The assumption often made is that, with relations between the US and USSR deteriorating rapidly, the public's attention shifted promptly from one enemy to another. As it did, 'hard-line anti-Germanism' was not merely viewed as anachronistic now that the Soviet Union posed a clear threat; increasingly, it was also deemed to be dangerous, even 'un-American,' 'at best a devilishly sly way of maintaining the wartime alliance with the Soviets, at worst a formula for promoting the Bolshevisation of Germany.' 10 Of course, the Cold War did play an significant role in the demise of the lobby, for it created an obvious chasm between senior officials who increasingly viewed the whole German problem through the prism of developing tensions with the USSR, and harsh-peace advocates who remained wedded to the conviction that Germany still posed the greatest menace to peace and stability.
But the Cold War was not the whole story. Indeed, even before the US-Soviet tensions erupted in earnest in 1947 the harsh-peace lobby was decidedly on the defensive, needing to counteract their loss of influence with the administration after Truman replaced Roosevelt, having to battle against a different type of news story once the media shifted its gaze from Nazi crimes to German squalor, and often hampering their own cause with overly radical proposals that were too easily caricatured as beyond the pale by their rivals. 11 it is also an attempt to explore some of the elements of the popular debate in the brief interregnum between World War and Cold War, a time when a degree of ambiguity remained on whether the central menace was Germany or the USSR.
I
The sudden appearance of the SPWW3's New York Times' advert in April 1944 was the product of three main concerns. The most obvious was the fact that, despite almost two-and-ahalf years of war, the public's attitude towards the German enemy remained distinctly benign.
Indeed, throughout 1943 and the first months of 1944, opinion polls consistently revealed that an overwhelming majority of Americans viewed only the Nazi leadership as the enemy. In September 1943, for instance, one poll found that less than a quarter of Americans thought that the Germans were inherently warlike. A short while later, another survey revealed that 71 percent felt 'the German government is the chief enemy,' with only 9 percent considering 'the German people as our main foe'; almost two-thirds of the public also confidently believed that the Germans wanted to get rid of their Nazi masters. The contrast with popular attitudes towards the Asian enemy was particularly striking, and explained the lobby's determination to focus on Germany rather Japan. As surveys found, more than half the American public believed the Japanese would 'always want war,' whereas only about a quarter of the population felt the same way about the Germans.
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That Americans hated the Japanese more than the Germans was hardly surprising
given that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor while the European war remained a somewhat distant affair; that the press had lavished far more attention on acts of Japanese savagery like the Bataan death march while generally neglecting the Holocaust; and that there was a racial undertone to the way in which many Americans viewed the Pacific war. 13 But for members of 5 the harsh-peace lobby, two other factors seemed far more germane. One was the Roosevelt administration's failure to educate the public out of such attitudes. The President himself had repeatedly emphasised that Germans would be treated fairly after the war, hoping that this would weaken the Germans' will to resist. 14 In the OWI, propagandists had tended to focus on the ideological threat posed by Nazism; some had also fretted that a campaign to arouse hatred against the Germans as a whole would have 'unfortunate results at the peace organized German propaganda has been so forceful in business circles, in the universities of our country, and in all walks of life, for the past decades, that there has been created a false picture of Germany's position in world affairs.
According to a well-prepared and well-executed plan, started by Bismarck, Germany has used the universities as a basis to inculcate and to exaggerate in the youth of our country the importance of Germany's contribution to world culture. The result of this organized propaganda is the existence of an undeserved and widespread sympathy for Germany and the Germans.
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Rex Stout was to prove a particularly pivotal figure in the organization of the harshpeace lobby. Perhaps befitting of a member of the liberal intelligentsia, his anti-Germanism he also inclined to the view that nations, like individuals, had their own free will and must face the consequences of their actions. Nor was Stout troubled with the CPI experience in
World War I, believing that a measure of exaggeration and blunt talking were essential to grab the public's attention. 21 Stout also quickly attracted support from a second group: those who harked back to 1918-1919, and were particularly convinced that recent problems stemmed from the fact that the last peace had been too soft. Indeed, Stout even brought George Creel into the SPWW3 fold, and the old propagandist was not slow to reprise his claim that 'never, in the course of German history have 'good Germans' constituted anything but a pitiful, ineffectual minority.'
A third group of recruits were those who had more recent experience of Germany, having These German émigrés had been at the core of the Society when it first emerged in summer of 1943, and they now found it somewhat difficult to adjust to the influx of new members from the world of media and the arts, fretting that some of the new recruits were insufficiently committed to keeping Germany weak. 23 But while there was a degree of tension amongst some of the SPWW3's constituent groups, Stout believed that the expertise of the German émigrés was vital to shield the organization from the charge that it was full of extremists and idealistic writers whose simplistic conception of the enemy had little grounding in German history, culture, or politics. In fact, the idea that the Society was made up of 'a permanent body on experts on international politics and economics' was at the core of the image it tried to present to the public. At the same time, Stout was also careful to send drafts of any key statements to other German experts like Frederick Schuman, Bernadotte E.
Schmitt, and Edward Meade Earle, asking them to vouch 'for its truth as historical fact.'
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Some harsh-peace advocates worried that this image of expertise sat somewhat uneasily next to the final group that was attracted to the SPWW3-those Americans whose anti-Germanism stemmed from a growing realization the Germans were exterminating Jews in occupied Europe. Indeed, at a time when polls showed that a pervasive, if relatively shallow, anti-Semitism still pervaded America, some prominent figures in the lobby were quick to distance themselves from any 'emotional' commitment to European Jews, for fear that this might tarnish the whole enterprise. Fadiman, for instance, was anxious to stress that he did not bear any ill will against the Germans 'because of their murder of the Jewish people'; his main gripe was with the 'profoundly evil in the system they have elected to live under.' Yet there was an obvious affinity between Stout's project and those who believed that the American public had to be made more aware of Germany's crimes. And, although Jewish-Americans and leading opinion formers alike were often divided on how to respond to the Holocaust, The examples of such prompting were legion. In June, for instance, the Board prevailed upon the National Enterprise Association to circulate short editorials to its 600 or so newspapers on subjects like 'How the Germans Expect to Work a Negotiated Peace' by Emil Ludwig and 'Aren't There Any Good Germans' by Cecil Brown. Throughout the summer, the American Legion Magazine took a variety of similar articles; one by the historian Allan Nevins, for instance, 'lambasting the revisionist school of historians, which tried to persuade us after the last war that it really wasn't Germany's fault at all, and who are beginning to raise their heads and squawk about the same thing about this war.' 30 At the same time, the radio networks were encouraged to air town hall debates on issues like the perils of German selfgovernment and whether all Germans were Nazis. Even comic strips were targeted, with
Standard Magazines Comic Division agreeing to run several strong anti-German pieces. These must be 'very simple, easy-language stuff,' the Board directed, which 'must leave a sting and it must be shocking in the way it portrays the brutality of the Germans.' As well as using the WWB's extensive network to persuade the media to air more anti-German sentiments, Board members also tried to obstruct the publication of anything deemed likely to create sympathy for a post-war Germany. Thus, the WWB pointedly failed to find outlets for pieces revealingly titled 'Too Hard a Peace May be Brittle' or 'Hitler Has a Keen Sense of Humour,' which, as the WWB's Executive Secretary explained, 'might mislead the public into readiness to make a soft peace.' Throughout the summer, the Board not only successfully got certain journals to withdraw patently pro-German items, but also repeatedly protested to book publishers and newspaper editors whenever they published PanGerman pieces. 33 When the inevitable complaints came back, Stout hastened to try and stress that his aim was not censorship. There was a difference, he claimed, between freedom of expression and the right to be published. And no one, Stout insisted, ought to be allowed to publish Pan-German ideas because, while experts might be 'sufficiently informed' to pick out the fallacies in such pieces, 'the general public is by no means well equipped.' 34 This basic pessimism about the public's susceptibility to soft-peace ideas also Bolstered by this revealing change of emphasis from certain official quarters, the SPWW3 expanded its efforts during the summer. To broaden its base, it opened branches in Chicago, Des Moines, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and Spokane. Its members also began privately lobbying senior officials in Washington. In June, the President's top military aide attended a talk by Foerster, which not only focused on the fact that the Nazi philosophy 'has been accepted and developed by the entire German people,' but also advocated dismemberment. By now, Roosevelt himself was privately convinced that some form of harsh peace would have to be imposed on the entire German nation, and was even inclining towards ideas like dismemberment. 42 He was therefore sympathetic to the broad thrust of the SPWW3 message, and invited Stout to the White House on a couple of occasions for informal chats.
Moreover, although highly cautious in his public statements, and still hoping to postpone a detailed public discussion about the peace until the war was won, during the summer The one saving grace was that the Morgenthau Plan leak had at least concentrated the public mind on the whole German problem, and although there was little support for Morgenthau's specific pastoralisation proposal, the media was now more interested in discussing Germany's future. One of the WWB's biggest breaks came in October, when the
March of Time devoted a whole newsreel to the question of 'What to Do with Germany?'
Clearly echoing the Board's basic line, this concluded that 'Germany's crimes are the direct responsibility of the German people.' Naturally delighted, the WWB worked hard to find the largest possible audience for this newsreel, arranging previews and urging editors and newspaper columnists to run pieces on it in the print media. 52 The next month, the Board also lined up speakers for a series of radio debates on reparations, a hot topic in light of the Morgenthau Plan. Its position in all these broadcasts was simple, and closely mirrored the Treasury position. 'The Soft Peace Boys think we should collect reparations,' the WWB explained. 'The Hard Peace Boys say no reparations because we would have to rebuild
German industry, re-establish her credit, etc., in order to make it possible for her to pay.' 53 Throughout the winter of 1944-1945, a number of developments helped the harshpeace lobby to launch a counterattack. One was Senator Kilgore's report, released five days after the election, which provided a new, more moderate, rallying point with its emphasis on 'the dismantling and removal' of just Germany's metallurgical and chemical industries.
Morgenthau was ecstatic about this, telling Kilgore that 'I thought you got out a swell report.' 54 After his re-election, Roosevelt also seemed more susceptible to such ideas. Indeed, although leery of anything that smacked of extensive deindustrialisation, in preparing for the Yalta Conference the President nevertheless included some SPWW3 literature in his 'trip file.' 55 On his return from Yalta in March, Roosevelt then spoke publicly of Germany as the number one problem of 'vital political consequence,' calling for complete disarmament and extensive reforms to eradicate the evils of militarism from the German body politic. The SPWW3 was quick to applaud the fact that Yalta 'has made one thing crystal clear': 'The theory that Nazism and Nazism alone was responsible for the aggressive character of the German nation is completely discredited once and for all time.' A few weeks later, it then issued its own policy statement, which clearly echoed the line taken by Kilgore-and perhaps implied by Roosevelt-with its emphasis on the need to separate the Ruhr, Rhineland, and the Saar completely from Germany, to ensure there was no heavy industry under German ownership. 56 Another development working in the anti-German lobby's favour during this period was the growing public awareness of the full extent of the Nazi crimes. In November the Board started to become more aggressive in this sphere, not only urging commentators like Walter Winchell to 'popularise' the word 'genocide' to describe Nazi crimes, but also helping to disseminate a War Refugee Board report that used eyewitness accounts to provide official confirmation of the Nazis' unprecedented 'campaign of terror and brutality.' 57 Then, in the spring of 1945, after the US Army liberated a series of concentration camps in the heart of the Reich, the WWB and SPWW3 were finally given the opportunity truly to exploit the atrocity angle. 58 Court the SPWW3 even won a $100,000 libel verdict, the judge upholding its claim that Ridder, the editor of several newspapers and journals, was the leader of the Pan-German conspiracy in the US It was a victory that seemed to confirm Stout's contention that proGerman propagandists had been at work trying to distort the American mind. But it was also a victory that would prove to mark the high-tidewater mark of the harsh-peace campaign. 62 
IV
Part of the problem the harsh-peace lobby faced in trying to maintain this momentum stemmed from the demise of the WWB. Through this organization, Stout had developed an extensive network of media contacts, which had been exploited to the full to place the antiGerman message firmly on the public agenda. But after VJ Day, the WWB swiftly came to an end. Although Stout tried to keep a successor organization going, without the urgency of war he was no longer able to motivate and mobilize writers, who were soon caught up in the general desire for demobilization, normalcy, and a return to peacetime pursuits. The SPWW3 did remain intact, but because it was a single-issue group, which lacked the extensive media connections and respectability of the WWB, and because its radical polemics and close 21 association with the Morgenthau Plan had already engendered deep suspicions in certain quarters, the SPWW3 was in a far weaker position to shoulder the whole burden. between East and West was the best way to avoid tension with the Soviets over Germany, Byrnes wanted to ensure that the western zones would retain sufficient industry so that the Germans-and not the US taxpayer-would finance necessary imports. 64 Yet, during the summer of 1945, the administration's new orientation was not always readily apparent to its domestic audience. In fact, in his public speeches and statements, the new President proved to be a consummate politician. All too aware of the drift of public opinion, on his return from Europe Truman clearly accentuated the punitive aspects of the Potsdam Protocol, placing the blame for the war squarely on the German people and stressing that the structure of the German economy would have to be radically altered with 'chief emphasis … on agriculture and peaceful industry.' 65 Similarly, in October, as news stories about the Army's 'lackadaisical attitude' towards the German occupation found their way into influential newspapers and opinion polls recorded that 52 percent believed the US occupation was 'not hard enough,' the President even decided to publicize JCS 1067, with its injunctions against taking any steps 'designed to maintain or strengthen the Germany economy.' Harshpeace advocates were naturally delighted. Morgenthau even wrote to Truman, praising him for this decision. Such an action, he insisted, would 'give the American public the opportunity to back you up in seeing that the Potsdam agreement is carried out.' were unworkable, and that key elements of the German economy would have to be rebuilt otherwise the Germans would starve. 67 As winter descended, media and congressional opposition to any policy that suggested 'planned economic chaos' began to intensify. Increasingly, news stories about Germany no longer focused on concentration camps or echoed the WWB's line about the culpability of the whole nation. Instead, the overwhelming emphasis was now on the destruction and chaos, the hunger as the daily calorie intake fell well below 1,500 calories mandated by JCS 1067, the cold and enforced idleness as wartime destruction remained unrepaired and the economy languished. Eyeing this environment with mounting concern, a growing number of leading figures began to press for a relief package for the German people. In Congress, a group of Republicans led by Senator Kenneth S. Wherry (R-NE) and Representative Harold Knutson Yet, increasingly, the harsh-peace lobby found it difficult to get this message across.
The SPWW3 now clearly lacked allies in the administration. Indicative of its changing fortunes was the 'roll of honour ' it compiled in February 1946, praising and keeping Germany down were fairly typical. In Mowrer's view, it was vital to contain the new Soviet menace. But he was also unconvinced by the administration's confidence that the recent destruction of the German industry together with future monitoring of the German activity, including supranational controls over the Ruhr, would be sufficient to stop Germany from again threatening its neighbours. 84 Instead, Mowrer firmly believed that the US had 'to make certain that ERP does not become an instrument for the revival of those predatory forces in Germany which have always looked with scorn upon democracy,' by ensuring that France, Holland, and Belgium were fed and revived first, even if this meant giving them important components of German industry. 85 As the debate on the ERP got underway, the SPWW3's problem was not so much that it was now discredited as excessively pro-Soviet. Rather, its difficulties stemmed more from the fact that the close connections it had forged with government and the media during the war had proved impossible to maintain-and this was largely the product of Roosevelt's death, a shift in the media gaze to German squalor, and the lobby's public association with the radical Morgenthau Plan, all of which predated the emergence of new Cold War political alignments.
Still, whatever the cause, the ERP debate now threw the SPWW3's basic weakness into particularly sharp relief, especially when its efforts were compared to those of a new pressure group, the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery (CMP). Indeed, while the CMP began a publicity barrage in the press and on the radio, the SPWW3 no longer had access to a large network of media outlets. While the CMP liased closely with senior figures in the Truman administration, the SPWW3 was now something of a pariah in official circles and was even rebuffed when it tried to 'to arouse the interests of prominent members of the Democratic Party, such as [Robert] Hannegan.' And while the CMP was remarkably active on the Hill, providing numerous witnesses and briefings throughout the duration of the congressional hearings, the SPWW3 was forced to work with just a few legislators, such as 33
